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ABSTRACT—Neuroscience-based creditability-assessment tests have
recently become increasingly mainstream, purportedly able to determine
whether an individual is lying to a certain set of questions (the Control
Question Test) or whether an individual recognizes information that only a
liable person would recognize (the Concealed Information Test). Courts
have hesitated to admit these tests as evidence for two primary reasons.
First, following the general standard that credibility assessment is a matter
solely for the trier of fact, courts exclude the evidence because it impinges
on the province of the jury. Second, because these methods have not been
rigorously tested in realistic scenarios, courts rule that they do not meet the
Daubert criteria for admissibility of expert testimony. This Comment
argues that while neuroscience-based credibility-assessment methods
should not currently be admissible under the Daubert standard, they may
become admissible with more research, and the courts should avoid creating
precedent that would preclude their admissibility once reliability issues are
addressed. Specifically, credibility assessment should not be left entirely to
the trier of fact because social science evidence indicates that laypeople are
poor at making credibility-assessment judgments based on behavioral cues.
Additionally, even if courts continue to rule that evidence assessing whether
a witness is telling the truth invades the province of the jury, this should not
preclude neuroscience-based credibility assessment that merely shows that
an individual recognizes something related to the issue at hand.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2010, Dr. Lorne Semrau was indicted for fraud after being accused
of intentionally submitting false claims for payment to health insurance
providers.1 Maintaining his innocence, Dr. Semrau hired Cephos,2 a forensic
analysis company, to conduct a neuroscience-based credibility-assessment
test to show that he was telling the truth in his denials of knowingly
defrauding the government.3 Dr. Semrau climbed into a functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI) scanner and answered a series of yes–no
questions about the alleged fraud4: “Did you . . . cheat or defraud
Medicare?”5 “Did you enter into a scheme to defraud the government by
1

United States v. Semrau, No. 07-10074 Ml/P, 2010 WL 6845092, at *2 (W.D. Tenn. May 31,
2010).
2
Cephos is one of two companies in the United States that provides a neuroscience-based liedetection service. CEPHOS, http://www.cephoscorp.com (last visited Aug. 4, 2012). The other is No-Lie
MRI. NO LIE MRI, http://noliemri.com/ (last visited Aug. 4, 2012). Both of these companies use
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to attempt to identify brain activity that is associated
with lying. CEPHOS, supra; NO LIE MRI, supra. While Cephos lie-detection tests have been offered (and
rejected) as evidence in two cases (Semrau, 2010 WL 6845092, at *3, and Wilson v. Corestaff Servs.
L.P., 900 N.Y.S.2d 639, 640 (Sup. Ct. 2010)), there have been no recorded instances of parties
attempting to introduce No Lie MRI tests as evidence.
3
Semrau, 2010 WL 6845092, at *4.
4
Id. at *4–8. fMRI is a method used to determine the level of activity in various parts of the brain.
See Nikos K. Logothetis & Brian A. Wandell, Interpreting the BOLD Signal, 66 ANN. REV.
PHYSIOLOGY 735, 735 (2004).
5
Semrau, 2010 WL 6845092, at *5.
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billing for . . . tests conducted by psychiatrists . . . ?”6 “Have you ever done
something illegal?”7 Dr. Steven Laken, the CEO of Cephos, subsequently
analyzed Dr. Semrau’s brain responses to the questions and determined that
Dr. Semrau was “not deceptive.”8 At trial, Dr. Semrau attempted to
introduce these brain scans as evidence through the expert witness
testimony of Dr. Laken.9 The court conducted a Daubert hearing to
determine the reliability of the test, concluding that it was not sufficiently
reliable to be admitted, primarily because its accuracy had not been
thoroughly tested in “real-world” settings outside of the laboratory.10
Contemporaneously with Dr. Semrau’s trial, an individual named
Cynette Wilson brought suit against a temporary employment agency,
alleging the agency retaliated against her by not placing her in work
assignments after she reported an incident of sexual harassment.11 Ms.
Wilson’s key witness was Ronald Armstrong, an employee of the defendant
company, who testified that the company had instructed him not to place
Ms. Wilson in work assignments because of her sexual harassment
complaints.12 Like Dr. Semrau, Ms. Wilson hired Cephos to conduct a liedetection test, this time on Mr. Armstrong to reinforce his credibility.13 Dr.
Laken conducted the test on Mr. Armstrong and asserted that he could tell
“to a very high probability that Armstrong [was] being truthful when he
testifie[d].”14
Like the court in United States v. Semrau,15 the Wilson v. Corestaff
Services L.P.16 court rejected the expert testimony, but relied upon entirely
different reasoning. Rather than asserting issues of reliability, the Wilson
court stated that “credibility is a matter solely for the jury . . . .”17 Thus,
6

Id.
Id. at *4.
8
Id. at *6.
9
Id. at *1.
10
See id. at *9–14. Additionally, because Dr. Semrau was retested after being originally identified
as deceptive, Dr. Laken violated Cephos’s standard protocol. See id. at *13. Under Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the controlling standard for admissibility of expert testimony in federal
cases, “the existence and maintenance of standards controlling [a] technique’s operation” is a factor to
consider in ruling on the admissibility of “a particular scientific technique.” 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993).
Presumably, the lack of a followed standard by Dr. Laken in Semrau would cut against admitting the
test.
11
Wilson v. Corestaff Servs. L.P., 900 N.Y.S.2d 639, 640 (Sup. Ct. 2010).
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
15
2010 WL 6845092.
16
900 N.Y.S.2d 639.
17
Id. at 642. It should be noted that the Wilson case was a New York state court case, and New
York follows the Frye standard for admissibility of expert testimony. See id. at 640. The Frye test
requires that evidence “must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the
particular field in which it belongs.” Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). In
7
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because the expert testimony concerned the credibility of the witness and
therefore “impinge[d] on the province of the jury[,] . . . [it] should be
treated with a great deal of skepticism.”18
These cases indicate two distinct obstacles to the admissibility of
neuroscience-based credibility assessment: first, rules that restrict all
credibility assessment to the trier of fact and preclude the use of expert
testimony as an aid to the jury’s credibility assessment (the issue in Wilson),
and second, the unreliability of the tests that prevents them from gaining
admissibility under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (the
issue in Semrau).
This Comment argues that while neuroscience-based credibilityassessment methods are not currently admissible under the Daubert
standard, further research may prove their reliability and therefore render
them admissible. Thus, the courts should avoid creating precedent that
would preclude their admissibility once these reliability issues are
addressed. Specifically, because social science evidence indicates that
laypeople are poor at making credibility-assessment judgments based on
behavioral cues, credibility assessment should not be left entirely to the trier
of fact if other tools, such as neuroscience, can aid them in their decision.
Additionally, even if courts continue to rule that evidence that directly
assesses whether a witness is telling the truth invades the province of the
jury, this should not preclude neuroscience-based credibility assessment
that merely shows that an individual possesses knowledge related to the
issue at hand.
Part I of this Comment provides an overview of two major types of
neuroscience-based credibility assessment, explains the theoretical bases for
each of those two methods, and describes the research assessing their
accuracy. Part II reviews the social science literature on the ability of
laypeople to assess credibility based on behavioral cues and asserts that
judges and jurors are unlikely to effectively determine which witnesses are
credible, and thus should not be the sole determiners of credibility. Part III
applies the four Daubert factors to neuroscience-based credibility
assessment and concludes that while the currently available tests should be
inadmissible, there is promise for neuroscience-based credibility assessment
once more realistic testing is conducted.

contrast, federal courts follow the Daubert standard under the Federal Rules of Evidence, which asks
whether the evidence is generally reliable. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594–95
(1993).
18
Wilson, 900 N.Y.S.2d at 642. The court rejected the evidence solely on this basis, though it
briefly mentioned that the evidence would also likely be disqualified because it was not derived from a
method generally accepted in the scientific community, as required under Frye. Id.
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I.

BACKGROUND

A. What Is Neuroscience-Based Credibility Assessment?
This Comment defines “neuroscience-based credibility assessment” as
any tool that can be used to assess the veracity of a witness’s statement
through measurements of brain activity. In particular, this Comment will
focus on two very distinct types of neuroscience-based tests: the Control
Question Test (CQT), which attempts to measure whether a person is telling
the truth, and the Concealed Information Test (CIT), which attempts to
measure whether a person has knowledge relating to a crime or other event.
Both of these tests were traditionally conducted on the polygraph machine19
but have since been adapted for use with techniques that measure brain
activity.
B. The Control Question Test
The test that tends to come to mind most quickly when a layperson
envisions a lie-detector test is the CQT. The CQT seeks to determine
whether an individual is lying about a particular question by comparing the
individual’s physiological response to that question with the individual’s
physiological response to a “control” question.20
The test consists of two critical items: relevant questions and control
questions.21 Relevant questions are germane to the subject of the
investigation (e.g., “Did you shoot your wife on the night of September
16th, 2004?”).22 In contrast, control questions are deliberately vague
questions about past actions that relate to the complementary relevant
question (e.g., “Prior to September 16th, 2004, had you ever hurt
anyone?”).23 Control questions are designed such that nearly any honest
examinee’s truthful answer would be “yes.”24 However, through the
interrogation process, the examinee is led to believe that he should be able
to truthfully answer all of these control questions “no,” (because a “yes”
19

See David C. Raskin, The Polygraph in 1986: Scientific, Professional, and Legal Issues
Surrounding Application and Acceptance of Polygraph Evidence, 1986 UTAH L. REV. 29, 31. The
polygraph measures “palmar sweating, blood pressure increases and respiratory changes” to determine
the veracity of a statement or the presence of concealed information. Id.
20
See William G. Iacono & David T. Lykken, The Case Against Polygraph Tests, in 5 MODERN
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY § 40:47 (David L. Faigman et al.
eds., 2011–2012). The “control” question is sometimes instead referred to as a “comparison question”
because it is not a true control in the scientific sense of the word. Id. at § 40:48. The control question is
not as emotionally charged as the relevant question, making it difficult to compare the two. See id.
§ 40:73. The CIT does not have the same problem, as is discussed infra Part I.C.
21
See id. § 40:47.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
See William G. Iacono, Detection of Deception, in HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY 688, 688
(John Cacioppo et al. eds., 3d ed. 2007).
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answer would be indicative of poor moral character, which the examinee is
led to believe may be used against him in the investigation), and thus the
examinee feels obligated to lie in response to the control questions.25 These
control questions are then used as an approximation of the innocent
examinee’s deceptive response, which is then compared to the examinee’s
response to the relevant question.26 If the physiological response to the
relevant question is stronger than the physiological response to the control
question, deception is inferred.27
Though popular among police departments and government agencies
for eliciting confessions and screening potential employees, the CQT has
come under criticism for its low accuracy rates.28 A recent report from the
National Research Council stated that the theoretical rationale for the CQT
is flawed, as an elevated physiological response to the relevant question
would be expected even from innocent individuals because the implications
of the relevant question are clear.29 For this reason, the CQT elicits many
false positives—cases in which truthful individuals are classified as
deceptive.30
For example, suppose an individual is given a CQT test to determine
whether he cheated on his 2003 tax return. A control question designed to
elicit a lie might be “Have you ever taken something that didn’t belong to
you?” Even though this question may elicit a lie (presumably a “no”
response is a lie), and therefore some physiological arousal, when the
participant hears the critical question, “Did you cheat on your 2003 tax
return?,” he knows that this is the critical question that will influence
whether he is prosecuted for a serious crime. Even if he is honest when he
answers “no” to this question, the extreme salience of its relationship to the
issue at hand may cause elevated physiological responses beyond that of the
control question, leading the examiners to believe that the accused is lying
when he is in fact telling the truth. Thus, though the polygraph-based CQT
is sometimes proffered in court, it is rarely admitted, with a majority of
states and federal courts disallowing it.31 Moreover, the 1923 landmark case
regarding the admissibility of scientific evidence, Frye v. United States,
rejected a polygraph-based precursor to the CQT because the test was not
generally accepted in the scientific community.32
25

See id.
See id. at 688–89.
27
See id.
28
See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE POLYGRAPH AND LIE DETECTION xiii, 19, 124–29
(2003); Iacono, supra note 24, at 690, 693–94.
29
See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 28, at 92–95; Iacono, supra note 24, at 694.
30
See Iacono, supra note 24, at 693.
31
See Jane Campbell Moriarty, Visions of Deception: Neuroimages and the Search for Truth,
42 AKRON L. REV. 739, 743–44 (2009).
32
293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). In Frye, the court rejected a “systolic blood pressure
deception test” used to detect deception that was highly related to the modern polygraph-based CQT. Id.
26
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For more than fifty years, the CQT was conducted on the polygraph
machine.33 The key assumption of the test was that the increased anxiety
associated with lying to the relevant questions would result in increased
sweating.34 Recently, however, the CQT has been adapted for use with
fMRI.35 Rather than measuring an indirect indicator of anxiety such as
sweating or heart rate, fMRI allows one to measure blood flow to the brain,
which is a better proxy for brain activity (and perhaps actual deception
itself) than are external measurements. fMRI measures brain function by
recording the “changes in blood flow that correspond to changes in local
brain activity.”36 Thus, when a particular area of the brain receives a greater
quantity of oxygenated blood than other areas, one can assume that area has
been more active.37 By identifying particular areas of the brain that are
associated with lying, an examiner could theoretically distinguish truth
from lies by examining which areas of the brain become active when a
subject answers a question.
Attempts to use this method to distinguish liars from truth tellers have
achieved mixed results. At least one study has reported accuracy rates as
high as 90%,38 though the design used some unrealistic methods,39 and
another study found only 78% accuracy.40 The relative dearth of this type of
research and the lack of replication of past studies make it difficult to
determine the true accuracy of fMRI-based lie detection. The use of fMRI
or other neuroimaging methods in general has rarely been admitted in the

at 1013–14. The defendant in the case offered the deception test as evidence of her innocence. Id. The
court rejected the test because it “ha[d] not yet gained . . . scientific recognition.” Id. at 1014.
33
The original CQT was developed by John Reid in 1947 in response to the shortcomings of a
previous similar polygraph technique called the relevant–irrelevant test. See Charles R. Honts et al., The
Case for Polygraph Tests, in 5 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 20, § 40:22. This method
was developed for the polygraph and continues to be used primarily with the polygraph. See id.
34
Though palmar sweating tends to be the primary measure used in polygraph tests, blood pressure
increases and respiratory changes are also frequently considered. See, e.g., Raskin, supra note 19, at 31.
35
See, e.g., F. Andrew Kozel et al., Detecting Deception Using Functional Magnetic Resonance
Imaging, 58 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 605, 605 (2005); Daniel D. Langleben et al., Telling Truth from
Lie in Individual Subjects with Fast Event-Related fMRI, 26 HUM. BRAIN MAPPING 262, 262–63 (2005).
36
Daniel D. Langleben et al., True Lies: Delusions and Lie-Detection Technology, 34 J.
PSYCHIATRY & L. 351, 359 (2006).
37
See, e.g., Logothetis & Wandell, supra note 4, at 760 (“The BOLD response provides us
unprecedented visibility of the neural activity in the human brain . . . .”). The term “BOLD” stands for
blood oxygen level dependent—it is a signal that measures blood flow to various areas of the brain. See
id. at 735–36.
38
Kozel et al., supra note 35, at 610.
39
The study involved the use of a “model building group” to identify approximately which neural
networks were involved in deception for the experiment’s particular paradigm. Id. at 605–06. This
method could not likely be used in field scenarios, where individual questions must be unique for each
person tested.
40
Langleben et al., supra note 35, at 267.
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courtroom,41 and a lie-detection test using fMRI has never been ruled
admissible.
C. The Concealed Information Test
The Concealed Information Test (CIT)42 is a credibility-assessment
protocol of an entirely different nature than the CQT. Instead of attempting
to detect actual lying (the goal of the CQT), the goal of the CIT is to
determine whether an individual possesses knowledge of specific details of
a crime or event.43 For example, if a murder was committed at 800 Church
Avenue using a .38 caliber revolver, the CIT seeks to determine whether a
suspect recognizes the address and type of weapon:
The CIT presents subjects with various stimuli, one of which is a crime-related
item (the probe, such as the gun used to commit a murder). Other stimuli
consist of control items that are of the same class (irrelevants, such as other
potentially deadly weapons: a knife, a bat, etc.) such that an innocent person
would be unable to discriminate them from the crime-related item. If the
subject’s physiological response is greater for the probe item than for
irrelevant items, then knowledge of the crime or other event is inferred.44

Like the CQT, the CIT was initially conducted using the polygraph; the
subject was expected to show elevated arousal when viewing crime-related
probe items.45 Since the original development of the CIT in the early 1960s,
the test has been adapted to be used through the measurement of
brainwaves. In 1965, Samuel Sutton and his colleagues discovered a
particular pattern of neuronal firing that signaled an individual’s recognition
of a unique or meaningful item.46 Because the response occurred
approximately 300 milliseconds after the presentation of the meaningful
item, the brainwave was eventually termed the “P300.”47 Just over twenty
41

See Jane Campbell Moriarty, Flickering Admissibility: Neuroimaging Evidence in the U.S.
Courts, 26 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 29, 39–40 (2008). For a case in which a PET scan was admitted to
establish brain trauma, however, see Brown v. Allerton Assocs., No. 17917/03, 2006 WL 3102331
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 5, 2006). There are other contexts in which neuroimaging has been used in the
courtroom. For a comprehensive review, see Owen D. Jones & Francis X. Shen, Law and Neuroscience
in the United States, in INTERNATIONAL NEUROLAW: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 349 (Tade Matthias
Spranger ed., 2012).
42
The CIT is also frequently referred to in the literature as the “Guilty Knowledge Test” or GKT.
See Honts et al., supra note 33, § 40:24.
43
See Iacono & Lykken, supra note 20, § 40:107.
44
John B. Meixner & J. Peter Rosenfeld, A Mock Terrorism Application of the P300-Based
Concealed Information Test, 48 PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY 149, 149 (2011).
45
See David T. Lykken, The GSR in the Detection of Guilt, 43 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 385, 385
(1959) (using the polygraph to conduct the first published CIT).
46
See Samuel Sutton et al., Evoked-Potential Correlates of Stimulus Uncertainty, 150 SCIENCE
1187, 1187 (1965). The item must also be infrequently presented in order to generate the P300
component. See id.
47
See id. at 1188.
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years later, researchers realized that the P300 could be used as a marker of
recognition of crime-relevant information in a CIT—when an individual
recognizes something she knows she used or saw during the commission of
a crime, she should have a large P300 response when presented with that
item.48
P300-based CITs have evolved over the past twenty years and have
achieved accuracy levels beyond those of the CQT, typically correctly
detecting individuals that possess concealed information at a rate at or
above 90% while keeping false positives (innocent individuals not
possessing concealed information that are misclassified) below 10%.49
Though the CIT is not currently used by American police forces, it is used
in Japan to help identify the perpetrators of crimes.50 One recent CIT
experiment reached 100% accuracy,51 and the CIT has received media
exposure for a number of its potential uses, including counterterrorism.52
Despite these benefits over the CQT, the CIT has rarely been submitted into
evidence, and it has never actually influenced the outcome of a trial.
To briefly summarize, we have now discussed two very different types
of credibility-assessment paradigms: (1) the Control Question Test (CQT),
which actually seeks to determine whether a statement or series of
statements is true or false, and (2) the Concealed Information Test (CIT),
which seeks to determine whether an individual possesses knowledge of
information relevant to a crime or other event. It is important here to
recognize that the CQT actually purports to determine whether an
individual is lying, while the CIT involves no lying at all—it instead
determines whether an individual recognizes an item that only a person
involved in a crime would recognize. With these two paradigms as a
foundation, we now turn to some of the potential hurdles that these tests
must clear before they could be admitted in a court of law.

48

See, e.g., Lawrence A. Farwell & Emanuel Donchin, The Truth Will Out: Interrogative
Polygraphy (“Lie Detection”) with Event-Related Brain Potentials, 28 PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY 531, 531–
32 (1991); J. Peter Rosenfeld et al., A Modified, Event-Related Potential-Based Guilty Knowledge Test,
42 INT’L J. NEUROSCIENCE 157, 157–58 (1988).
49
See, e.g., Meixner & Rosenfeld, supra note 44, at 152–53 (reporting high levels of detection
accuracy among twenty-four participants in a mock terrorist attack without any advance knowledge of
the crime-related details); J. Peter Rosenfeld et al., The Complex Trial Protocol (CTP): A New,
Countermeasure-Resistant, Accurate, P300-Based Method for Detection of Concealed Information,
45 PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY 906, 913 tbl.3b (2008) (reporting 92% detection accuracy with only 8% false
positives).
50
See Gershon Ben-Shakhar et al., Trial by Polygraph: Reconsidering the Use of the Guilty
Knowledge Technique in Court, 26 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 527, 528, 536 (2002).
51
Meixner & Rosenfeld, supra note 44, at 151 tbl.1.
52
Eben Harrell, Fighting Crime by Reading Minds, TIME SCIENCE (Aug. 7, 2010),
http://www.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,2009131,00.html (covering Meixner & Rosenfeld,
supra note 44).
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II. THE JURY’S CREDIBILITY-ASSESSING ROLE AS A HURDLE TO
ADMISSIBILITY
A. The Current Standard of “the Jury as Lie Detector”
Perhaps the most serious threat to the admissibility of neurosciencebased credibility-assessment evidence is the concept that “the jury is the lie
detector,”53 which leads to a viewpoint that “credibility is a matter solely for
the jury.”54 This concern is regularly raised in cases in which one of the
parties attempts to admit lie-detection evidence based on the polygraph.55
Such a position would prevent the admission of any expert testimony
regarding credibility, regardless of its reliability or probative value to the
trier of fact.56 Thus, even if a lie-detection tool achieved 100% accuracy
when used in the hands of an expert, it would likely be precluded from use
because it would “invade the . . . province of the jury”57 and “[b]y its very
nature . . . diminish the jury’s role in making credibility determinations.”58
The most recent Supreme Court case in which the role of the jury was
addressed with regard to a credibility-assessment tool was United States v.
Scheffer.59 In Scheffer, an Air Force officer was court-martialed for
methamphetamine use after failing a drug test.60 Prior to receiving his test
results, the defendant took a polygraph test,61 which “indicated no
deception.”62 By an 8–1 vote, the Court concluded that Military Rule of
53

United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 313 (1998) (quoting United States v. Barnard, 490 F.2d
907, 912 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 959 (1974)).
54
Wilson v. Corestaff Servs. L.P., 900 N.Y.S.2d 639, 642 (Sup. Ct. 2010) (emphasis added).
55
See, e.g., Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 306–07, 313; State v. Porter, 698 A.2d 739, 742, 769 (Conn. 1997)
(asserting that the principal problem in introducing polygraph-based lie-detection evidence is that it will
“invade the fact-finding province of the jury”). It should be noted that the jury could still be the final
determiner of credibility (and guilt) even if lie-detection evidence like the CQT were allowed into
evidence. That is, the jury could still weigh the lie-detection evidence with all of the other evidence
(e.g., demeanor, consistency of statements, etc.) and make a final decision as to whether they think the
witness was being truthful. The argument made in Scheffer, however, is that the jury must be the only
determiner of credibility, which would preclude lie-detection evidence, or any other evidence that
directly speaks to the credibility of one of the witnesses. For extended discussion on this in the context
of both the CQT and CIT, see infra Part II.D.
56
See, e.g., Barnard, 490 F.2d at 912 (excluding the testimony of a psychiatrist and psychologist
called to testify to the likelihood that another witness was telling the truth).
57
Porter, 698 A.2d at 769.
58
Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 313.
59
523 U.S. 303.
60
Id. at 306.
61
The polygraph test that the defendant underwent was a CQT. Id. at 306 & n.1. The Court did not
elaborate on the differences between the CQT and the CIT in the opinion, leaving it ambiguous as to
whether the holding applies to polygraph tests of all varieties or merely to the polygraph-based CQT.
For a discussion of this, see Megan J. Erickson, Note, Daubert’s Bipolar Treatment of Scientific Expert
Testimony—From Frye’s Polygraph to Farwell’s Brain Fingerprinting, 55 DRAKE L. REV. 763, 784–86
(2007).
62
Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 306.
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Evidence 707, which bars the admission of polygraph evidence in courtmartial proceedings, does not violate a defendant’s right to present a
defense.63
However, the Justices did not agree on the reasoning by which they
reached this holding.64 Justice Thomas, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices Scalia and Souter, opined that Rule 707 serves the
government’s legitimate interest in “[p]reserving the court members’ core
function of making credibility determinations in criminal trials.”65 Without
citing any empirical work or even anecdotal evidence, Justice Thomas
simply asserted that the members of the jury “are presumed to be fitted [to
assess credibility] by their natural intelligence and their practical knowledge
of men and the ways of men.”66 Justice Thomas stated that an expert who
testifies regarding credibility is not providing “factual matters outside the
jurors’ knowledge,” but is instead “supply[ing] the jury only with another
opinion, in addition to its own, about whether the witness was telling the
truth.”67
The concurring Justices disagreed, stating that the principal opinion
“overreach[ed]” in deciding that the introduction of lie-detection evidence
diminishes the jury’s role as the arbiter of credibility.68 These Justices
instead focused on the lack of scientific evidence regarding the accuracy of
polygraph-based lie detection as the reason to prevent admissibility.69
Indeed, the concurring opinion explicitly stated that a per se rule excluding
expert testimony was unwise, as “some later case might present a more
compelling case for introduction of the testimony than this one does.”70
Justice Stevens’s dissent went even further, stating that potential injustice
may result from blanket rules against the admissibility of entire categories
of relevant but potentially unreliable evidence.71
Despite the fact that the principal opinion did not provide substantive
support for its assertion that the jury has a unique monopoly on credibility
63

Id. at 305, 308.
Id. at 312–14, 318 (concurring Justices joining only in the judgment and in Parts I, II.A, and II.D
of the opinion).
65
Id. at 312–13. This was not the only consideration by which the Court reached its holding. The
Court also considered the broad latitude of lawmakers in restricting the presentation of evidence without
restricting due process, id. at 308, as well as the lack of scientific consensus regarding the reliability of
polygraph tests, id. at 309–11. Though the Court never distinguished between the CQT and CIT, both of
which may be conducted using the polygraph, one may assume that the Court was referring only to the
CQT, as the literature cited is regarding the CQT.
66
Id. at 313 (quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 140 U.S. 76, 88 (1891)).
67
Id.
68
Id. at 318.
69
Id. (“Given the ongoing debate about polygraphs, I agree the rule of exclusion is not so arbitrary
or disproportionate that it is unconstitutional.”).
70
Id.
71
Id. at 327–30 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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assessment, the notion has continued to be popular. In Wilson v. Corestaff
Services L.P., the court rejected the plaintiff’s offering of fMRI-based
credibility evidence in large part because of a concern that the evidence
would “impinge[] on the province of the jury.”72 Applying the Frye test for
admissibility of scientific evidence,73 the court did not cite a single peerreviewed study of fMRI lie detection to indicate that the method had not
reached general acceptance in the field.74 Instead, the court asserted that the
trial would be “complex and confusing . . . for the jury if it were faced with
conflicting expert opinions, each with scientific authority to support it, upon
the collateral matter of credibility.”75 The court assumed, without empirical
assessment, that jurors are perfectly capable of assessing the credibility of
witnesses.76
One question remains unanswered in these opinions: Is it a bad thing to
“diminish the jury’s role in making credibility determinations[?]”77 In other
words, should the jury be the sole decider regarding matters of credibility?
This determination is inevitably based on the accuracy of jurors’ credibility
determinations. Are juries “unable or incompetent to evaluate the evidence
and draw inferences and conclusions”78 when it comes to issues of witness
credibility? If one of the chief goals of the trial is to resolve disputes
accurately,79 the best approach is to admit whatever evidence will increase
the accuracy of credibility judgments. If jurors are more accurate in their
own credibility judgments than they would be with the assistance of expert
72

900 N.Y.S.2d 639, 642 (Sup. Ct. 2010).
The Frye test outlines a standard where scientific evidence “must be sufficiently established to
have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.” Frye v. United States, 293 F.
1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). For more discussion of this test, see infra Part III.A.
74
See Wilson, 900 N.Y.S.2d at 641–42.
75
Id. (quoting People v. Williams, 159 N.E.2d 549, 554 (N.Y. 1959)).
76
See id. at 642. In rejecting the credibility-assessment evidence, the court stated that “it is well
established that unless the jurors are unable or incompetent to evaluate the evidence and draw inferences
and conclusions, the opinion of an expert, which intrudes on the province of the jury, is both
unnecessary and improper.” Id. (citing Kulak v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 351 N.E.2d 735 (1976)).
77
United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 313 (1998).
78
Wilson, 900 N.Y.S.2d at 642.
79
There are other important potential goals of the trial system that may not favor outcome accuracy.
For example, there may be a legitimate social goal of procedural justice in the trial system; that is,
giving people the opportunity to be heard and maximizing the perceived legitimacy of the judicial
system. See Tom R. Tyler & E. Allan Lind, Procedural Justice, in HANDBOOK OF JUSTICE RESEARCH IN
LAW 65, 74–88 (Joseph Sanders & V. Lee Hamilton eds., 2001). Maximizing procedural justice could,
in some cases, be in conflict with maximizing outcome accuracy. For example, if jurors make less
accurate credibility assessments without the aid of expert testimony regarding credibility than they
would with the aid of such testimony, their accuracy will be reduced by not admitting the expert
testimony. However, the procedural justice may be increased by rejecting the testimony if perceived
procedural fairness is strongly tied to receiving a judgment from peers regarding the truthfulness of
testimony, rather than from an expert. While it is not clear how procedural justice may be influenced by
experts testifying with regard to credibility, a complete discussion of this is beyond the scope of this
Comment. The remainder of this Comment will focus on policies that maximize outcome accuracy.
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testimony on the matter, then the testimony should not be allowed because
it would confuse an already-accurate trier of fact. However, if jurors are
inaccurate in their credibility assessments, a universal rule restricting
credibility assessment to the jurors’ own evaluations—thereby excluding
expert testimony on the matter—could lead to less accurate decisions.
Thus, the merit of a rule that categorically excludes expert testimony
regarding witness credibility turns on the ability of the trier of fact to assess
witness credibility on its own. Because there is a well-developed literature
on the ability of laypeople to assess credibility, empirical analysis can
inform decisions regarding the rule. The remainder of Part II reviews the
literature on laypeople’s ability to assess credibility without the aid of
assessment tools like the polygraph or fMRI, and concludes that jurors are
likely to be inaccurate in assessing credibility based on demeanor cues.
Additionally, while jurors may potentially be better when using contextual
cues, the research is not sufficiently well-developed to reach a strong
conclusion.
B. Credibility Assessment Based on Demeanor
It seems only natural to assume that individuals can detect lies of
others based on factors like facial expressions, tone of voice, aversion of
gaze, and general nervousness. After all, nearly everyone has had the
experience of lying to a friend or parent and being unable to look that
person in the eye. The notion that we are able to distinguish between truth
and lies is ubiquitous in our media as well. For example, the television
show Lie to Me focused on Dr. Cal Lightman, a fictional deception expert
whose character is loosely based on deception researcher Dr. Paul Ekman.80
According to the show’s website:
If you lie to Lightman, he’ll see it in your face and your posture or hear it in
your voice. If you shrug your shoulder, rotate your hand or even just slightly
raise your lower lip, Lightman will spot the lie. By analyzing facial
expressions and involuntary body language, he can read feelings ranging from
hidden resentment to sexual attraction to jealousy.81

Even the Supreme Court has perpetuated the idea that one’s demeanor
is likely to reveal his lies. In Coy v. Iowa, a Confrontation Clause case in
which the defendant was charged with sexual assault, the Court stated, “It is
always more difficult to tell a lie about a person ‘to his face’ than ‘behind
his back.’ In the former context, even if the lie is told, it will often be told
less convincingly.”82
80

See The (Real!) Science Behind Fox’s Lie to Me, POPULAR MECHANICS (Oct. 1, 2009, 12:00
AM), http://www.popularmechanics.com/science/4300722.
81
Lie to Me, PAUL EKMAN GROUP, http://awstats.paulekman.com/drupal/?q=Lie-to-me (last visited
Aug. 4, 2012) (summarizing the former television show’s website).
82
487 U.S. 1012, 1019 (1988).
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It would be wonderful if judges and jurors were able to determine the
credibility of witnesses by carefully staring at the witnesses’ shoulders and
lower lips during testimony, but an abundance of research into laypeople’s
and trained individuals’ ability to detect lies has shown that people are
simply not very good at detecting lies by analyzing demeanor.83
Additionally, training individuals to look for certain demeanor-based cues
does not significantly improve accuracy; in fact, it increases misplaced
confidence in one’s own abilities to detect lies and leads to a bias toward
suspecting others’ untruthfulness.84
Early studies that sought to determine what types of behavioral cues
were associated with deception typically utilized referees who would
simply count the instances of a particular behavior when an individual
(called the sender) was either lying or telling the truth.85 For example, a
listener would record each instance that a sender blinked while the sender
was lying, and again while the sender was telling the truth. These studies
found some relationships between certain types of demeanors and
deception, such as eye movements, mouth movements, stiffness of postures,
and relaxation.86 However, when individuals in these early studies
attempted to differentiate between equally true and false statements, they
only achieved accuracy levels between 45% and 60%.87
These studies typically restrict the listener’s interaction such that the
only cues that she could use to detect deception are verbal and nonverbal
demeanor cues, as opposed to cues gleaned from the content of the message
(e.g., consistency, detail). For example, Ekman and Maureen O’Sullivan
conducted an experiment in which listeners were shown ten one-minute
samples from interviews of college-aged women describing their feelings
about a nature film they were watching.88 Half of these women were
actually watching the nature film and truthfully describing their positive
feelings, while the other half were watching a gruesome film that was
upsetting to them and were lying about having positive feelings.89 Groups of
individuals observed these interviews to determine the veracity of the
statements.90
83

See infra Part II.C.
See infra text accompanying notes 95–112.
85
See Miron Zuckerman et al., Verbal and Nonverbal Communication of Deception, 14 ADVANCES
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1, 11 (1981). Extensive review of these early demeanor studies is
beyond the scope of this Comment. For a review of these studies, see Bella M. DePaulo et al., Cues to
Deception, 129 PSYCHOL. BULL. 74 (2003), and, Zuckerman, supra.
86
See Zuckerman, supra note 85, at 41–44 apps. 1A–1B.
87
Id. at 26.
88
Paul Ekman & Maureen O’Sullivan, Who Can Catch a Liar?, 46 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 913, 915
(1991).
89
Id.
90
Id. at 914–15. The different groups included college students, psychiatrists, judges, robbery
investigators, federal polygraphers, and Secret Service agents. Id.
84
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Aside from Secret Service agents, every group was near chance
accuracy, ranging from 52% to 57% accurate.91 Additionally, prior to
viewing the tape, each listener was asked to estimate his ability to tell when
other people are lying, and then was asked to estimate how well he had
done on assessing the interviews.92 Neither estimate was significantly
correlated with accuracy on the task, indicating that the listeners were
unable to discern how effectively they determined credibility based on
demeanor evidence.93
One interesting result of the Ekman and O’Sullivan study, however,
was that Secret Service agents were considerably more accurate than the
other groups, achieving 64% accuracy.94 This leads to an important
question: Could laypeople, such as jurors, be trained to better recognize
deception based on demeanor evidence, thereby making the jury an efficient
lie detector and alleviating the need for expert testimony regarding
credibility?
A series of studies by Saul Kassin and colleagues involving mock
crime interrogations sheds some light on this question. In a first study, eight
college students were instructed to commit a mock crime, while eight others
committed a related innocent act.95 All of the students then underwent a
five-minute interrogation, during which the students were instructed to deny
having committed any crime.96 The interrogations were taped and shown to
forty students who were asked to assess the veracity of the senders’
denials.97 Prior to watching the interrogations, half of the forty students
were trained for thirty minutes in the Reid Technique98—a method that uses
verbal and nonverbal cues to detect deception.99 Those students who were
not trained in the Reid Technique had an accuracy rate of 52%, while those
individuals that were trained achieved an accuracy of only 45%.100 This
lower accuracy rate was compounded by the fact that those individuals
91

Id. at 916 & tbl.2.
Id. at 915.
93
Id. at 916–17.
94
Id. at 916 tbl.2.
95
Saul M. Kassin & Christina T. Fong, “I’m Innocent!”: Effects of Training on Judgments of Truth
and Deception in the Interrogation Room, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 499, 501–03 (1999). Subjects
committed one of four possible crimes, such as vandalizing the wall of a university building. Id.
Innocent acts involved going to the same location, but not committing any crime. Id.
96
Id. at 503–04.
97
Id. at 506.
98
Id. at 505.
99
The Reid Technique is the leading method of training law enforcement officials to conduct
interrogations, detect deception, and elicit confessions. The method is outlined in a book co-authored by
John Reid. See FRED E. INBAU ET AL., CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 187–90 (5th ed.
2013).
100
Kassin & Fong, supra note 95, at 508. It should be noted that this accuracy is less than chance,
indicating that the method is actually reducing lie-detection ability, rather than augmenting it.
92
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trained in the Reid Technique had higher confidence than those not trained,
despite their reduced accuracy.101
This phenomenon has been replicated in several follow-up studies
examining highly trained police officers’ abilities to assess the veracity of
interview statements. In a 2002 study, Christian Meissner and Kassin
presented highly trained and experienced police investigators with the same
interrogation videos used in the 1999 Kassin and Christina Fong study
described above.102 Like the students of the Kassin and Fong study, the
investigators were no better than chance at detecting deception in the
interrogations and yet were more confident in their judgments than were the
trained students.103 Once again, investigator confidence was not correlated
with accuracy.104 Notably, both the trained officers and trained students
were more likely to misdiagnose truthful senders as deceptive,105 reflecting
a bias in trained individuals towards assuming that senders will be
deceptive.106
Although these are only a few of the many studies conducted regarding
laypeople’s ability to assess demeanor evidence, several authors have
conducted meta-analyses107 that combine data from a number of studies and
look for literature-wide effects. The most comprehensive of these is a 2006
meta-analysis by Charles Bond and Bella DePaulo, which combined the
results of 206 studies that included over 24,000 individuals “who judge[d]
deception from a brief encounter with an unfamiliar sender in real time.”108
Across this extremely large sample gathered from a variety of different labs
and researchers, the authors found a 54% overall accuracy of deception
101

Id. at 509. Confidence was measured by asking each receiver to self-rate his confidence, on a
scale from one to ten, after viewing each interrogation. Id.
102
Christian A. Meissner & Saul M. Kassin, “He’s Guilty!”: Investigator Bias in Judgments of
Truth and Deception, 26 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 469, 474 (2002). The investigators had an average of
nearly fourteen years of experience and 68% of the investigators had undergone formal training in the
detection of deception. Id.
103
Id. at 475 tbl.2, 476.
104
Id. at 476.
105
Id. at 475 tbl.2.
106
Meissner and Kassin found this “more liberal response criterion” (i.e., a tendency to assume that
others are lying more frequently than telling the truth) in a number of other studies of individuals trained
in using demeanor evidence to detect deception. Id. at 472–73 & tbl.1 (citing Paul Ekman et al., A Few
Can Catch a Liar, 10 PSYCHOL. SCI. 263 (1999); Kassin & Fong, supra note 95; Stephen Porter et al.,
Truth, Lies, and Videotape: An Investigation of the Ability of Federal Parole Officers to Detect
Deception, 24 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 643 (2000)).
107
A meta-analysis is “the statistical analysis of a large collection of analysis results from
individual studies for the purpose of integrating the findings.” Gene V. Glass, Primary, Secondary, and
Meta-Analysis of Research, 5 EDUC. RESEARCHER 3, 3 (1976). Typically, a meta-analysis uses statistical
methods to find the size of a particular effect that has been measured by an entire field of research. See
id.
108
Charles F. Bond, Jr. & Bella M. DePaulo, Accuracy of Deception Judgments, 10 PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 214, 216–17, 219 (2006).
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judgments, much like the accuracy rates found in the Kassin and Ekman
studies above.109 This meta-analysis excluded studies that involved training,
so it does not speak to the confidence and bias effects mentioned above,110
but a number of other studies have found effects of training similar to those
found by Meissner and Kassin.111
These studies raise serious concerns about jurors’ ability to assess
credibility based on demeanor evidence. If jurors are untrained, they are
likely to be only slightly above chance accuracy. Moreover, brief training
like that used in the 1999 Kassin and Fong study is unlikely to make jurors
more accurate assessors of credibility. Perhaps extensive training and
experience of the kind provided to Secret Service agents could help increase
jurors’ abilities slightly, but this is probably unrealistic for jurors who have
only a short period of time to receive instructions from the court.112
Additionally, even if such training was sufficiently cost and time
efficient to be feasible and was able to produce small increases in accuracy
like those found by Ekman, the increased confidence associated with the
training could still be highly problematic in the courtroom. When a juror
hears testimony, the credibility of the witness is only one of the factors he
must consider. He must also consider things such as the quality of the
evidence, the weight to be given to that evidence, and the influence of the
evidence on previous information. If a juror is highly confident in his ability
to assess the veracity of the witness’s statements, that juror may completely
disregard evidence when he suspects a witness is lying, even when the
witness provides reliable evidence that carries strong weight. Thus,
confidence in credibility assessment is a detriment to accuracy when those
assessments themselves are inaccurate.
Likewise, the bias that Meissner and Kassin found toward assuming
others are deceptive as a result of the deception training could further
undermine accuracy in the courtroom. In controlled experiments where
there is an equal balance between truthful and deceptive statements, this
bias may only have a small effect on overall accuracy, depending on the
strength of the bias. But in the courtroom, where it is likely that the
majority of witnesses are telling the truth, a bias toward assuming witnesses
are deceptive could reduce jurors’ assessments of credibility to well below
chance levels.

109

Id. at 219.
Id. at 218.
111
See supra note 106.
112
One criticism of training paradigms like the one used by Kassin and Fong is that they are so
short that they are virtually guaranteed to be ineffective. However, in the trial context, the thirty minute
training session is likely very close to the maximum of what could be employed by the court, given the
demands placed on a jury. Even if time constraints were not a factor, the cost of serious training would
likely be prohibitive.
110
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C. Credibility Assessment Based on Content
Though the behavioral research discussed above has not gained
traction in the courts, a number of legal scholars have written on the
topic.113 The majority of these discussions have focused on research
examining credibility assessment through demeanor evidence alone, and
have thus concluded that jurors are likely ineffective credibility assessors.114
Recently, however, Max Minzner noted that the literature focusing on
demeanor evidence alone does not fully describe the jury’s ability to assess
credibility.115 In addition to demeanor, the jury may use the context,
consistency, and depth of witnesses’ statements to determine their veracity.
Thus, the experiments by Kassin, Ekman, and their ilk may capture
only a small amount of what juries actually do in the courtroom to assess
credibility. By allowing individuals to assess only a short segment of
testimony, these experiments prevent receivers from comparing the sender’s
story with others’ stories, as a juror would be able to do while listening to
multiple witnesses at trial.
Two distinct questions arise from the shortcomings of the demeanor
studies. First, do jurors use context, consistency, and depth to assess
credibility in the courtroom? Second, if they do use the full amount of
information available at trial, are jurors accurate in making credibility
determinations? Minzner cites two studies in support of the position that
jurors do rely on context.116
In the first study, Hee Sun Park and her collaborators conducted a
survey of 202 undergraduate students in which they asked participants “to
recall a recent situation in which they had discovered that someone had lied
to them . . . and recall as much information as they could about what
happened.”117 After this free recall period, participants were asked several
questions about the instance they recalled, including one question about
how they detected the lie.118 The survey found that 32% of the lies were
detected through third-party information, 31% were detected through a
113

See, e.g., Jeremy A. Blumenthal, A Wipe of the Hands, a Lick of the Lips: The Validity of
Demeanor Evidence in Assessing Witness Credibility, 72 NEB. L. REV. 1157 (1993); Joseph W. Rand,
The Demeanor Gap: Race, Lie Detection, and the Jury, 33 CONN. L. REV. 1 (2000); Chris William
Sanchirico, “What Makes the Engine Go?” Cognitive Limitations and Cross-Examination, 14 WIDENER
L. REV. 507 (2009).
114
See supra Part II.B.
115
See Max Minzner, Detecting Lies Using Demeanor, Bias, and Context, 29 CARDOZO L. REV.
2557, 2564 (2008) (“Today’s findings . . . are far more complex than the then-current research and give
us a much greater ability to identify those situations in which we need to worry about mistaken
judgments about credibility and those in which we do not.”).
116
Id. at 2567–68.
117
Hee Sun Park et al., How People Really Detect Lies, 69 COMM. MONOGRAPHS 144, 149 (2002).
118
Id. at 149–50. The question read, “Now, think about how you found out that the person lied to
you. Describe in as much detail as you can the events surrounding your discovery of the lie: how exactly
did you find out that the person lied to you?” Id. at 150.
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combination of various methods, 18% were detected through physical
evidence, and only 2% were detected with demeanor-based evidence.119
While these results are interesting, they are flawed for a number of
reasons. First, because the participants were invited to freely recall a single
instance in which they detected a lie, they might be biased toward recalling
certain instances more than others. For example, if it is easier to detect a lie
by discovering third-party information that exposes the lie than it is to
detect the lie by demeanor, participants may be more likely to recall those
lies detected via third-party information, skewing the results.120 Similarly,
there might be categorical differences in the extent to which people recall
detecting lies based on information compared to detecting lies based on
demeanor, regardless of which method is more common.
But even assuming that these individuals are correctly recalling what
methods they used and that they selected the lie they described without any
bias, the data still do not indicate how jurors might assess credibility. The
situations that the participants described were likely vastly different from
what a juror would hear in court. The majority of lies in the Park study were
detected through third-party information or physical evidence,121 both of
which are unlikely to happen in the courtroom. The authors do not define
what they mean by “third party information,” but one can reasonably
assume this means that a trusted source contradicted the liar in a way that
could be confirmed. While there is contradiction aplenty in the courtroom, a
witness would rarely make such a blatant lie that some piece of evidence
provided at trial would clearly expose that lie, because witnesses know
what evidence is going to be presented. This situation is distinct from lies
outside of the courtroom, where the liar might assume that the receiver will
not discover any information that would clearly expose the lie. It is
precisely because lies cannot be easily detected in the courtroom via other
witnesses or physical evidence that jurors might turn to demeanor-based
cues.
Though the Park study tells us little about what actual jurors are doing
to assess credibility in the courtroom, the second study cited by Minzner
does support the notion that jurors use context in their credibility
determinations. In a large and ongoing line of research, Shari Seidman
Diamond examined questions asked by jurors in fifty civil cases in Arizona
state courts, where jurors are allowed to present questions to witnesses in
civil cases.122 Diamond and colleagues found that 42% of all juror questions
119

Id.
This phenomenon is referred to in the psychological literature as the availability heuristic. For a
more complete description, see Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for
Judging Frequency and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207 (1973).
121
Park, supra note 117, at 150.
122
Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Juror Questions During Trial: A Window into Juror Thinking,
59 VAND. L. REV. 1927, 1937 (2006). Jurors are allowed to present questions in Arizona state civil
120

1469

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

were what the authors labeled as “cross-checking,” questions in which
“jurors apply a commonsense structure to evaluating potentially unreliable
sources of information.”123 Essentially, these questions reflect the jurors’
attempt to find consistency across a large number of potentially inconsistent
stories that they have heard from all of the witnesses. This information was
often sought from a disinterested witness who might be able to provide a
reliable fact against which the testimony from the interested witnesses
could be compared.124
While this study is informative because it shows that jurors use
coherence of stories to assess credibility, jurors’ questions to the witnesses
are unlikely to capture all of the considerations that comprise their
determinations. For example, it seems highly unlikely that a juror would ask
a witness a question about demeanor (e.g., “Why did you appear so nervous
on the stand?”). Thus, the study does not provide a comparison point to
know how much credibility assessments are influenced by demeanor as
opposed to content-based cross-checking.
One other limitation of the Diamond study is that forty-seven of the
fifty cases sampled were tort cases, most of which involved either a motor
vehicle crash or medical malpractice.125 It is possible that the jurors’
credibility assessment varies by context. Perhaps in those cases where
liability turns on the veracity of two contradictory testimonies, such as
those of a single eyewitness and a criminal defendant, there will be reduced
context from which jurors can draw to make content-based decisions of
credibility. In such cases, jurors may rely more on demeanor in making
their credibility assessments.
Despite these limitations, it seems very likely that jurors use context to
determine the consistency of a witness’s testimony, though it is not yet clear
how this compares to the use of demeanor. Regardless, this leads to the next
question in the analysis: If jurors do use context to determine credibility,
does this lead to more accurate assessments of credibility than the use of
demeanor evidence? Minzner argues that by placing all of the information
heard at trial into context and examining the differences between the
statements of various witnesses, the jury can accurately assess credibility
without needing to consider demeanor evidence.126 Minzner discusses two
studies by Maria Hartwig to support this view.127
In the first study, Hartwig used the same crime and interrogation
paradigm of the 1999 Kassin and Fong study described above. College
cases. The rule provides that “[j]urors shall be permitted to submit to the court written questions directed
to witnesses or to the court.” ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 39(b)(10) (2011).
123
Diamond et al., supra note 122, at 1956–57.
124
Id.
125
Id. at 1937.
126
See Minzner, supra note 115, at 2567–68.
127
Id. at 2568–69.
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students were instructed to either commit a mock crime by stealing a wallet
out of a briefcase in a movie store, or an innocent act by going into the
video store and leaving.128 Then, subjects were interrogated as in the 1999
Kassin and Fong study, with all students denying commission of the
crime.129 However, in this experiment, the time at which the interrogator
disclosed the evidence against the student was varied. In an “early
disclosure” condition, the interrogator presented three items of evidence
against the student at the beginning of the interrogation and then provided
the student a “free recall” period to explain what happened.130 In a
complementary “late disclosure” condition, the interrogator withheld the
three pieces of evidence from the student, first providing a free recall period
and then presenting the evidence against the student at the end of the
interrogation.131 After the interviews, 116 students viewed the tape of one of
the interrogations and judged the veracity of the statements made by the
suspects.132 Overall accuracy was 53%, but those observing the early
disclosure interrogations were only 43% accurate while the late disclosure
group was 62% accurate.133
Minzner argues that the late disclosure condition is a better simulation
of the jury’s experience, and thus, juries are more likely to accurately assess
credibility than the previous demeanor-based experiments implied.134
However, there are still problems in applying the Hartwig study to the
courtroom. First, while late disclosure strategy could readily be employed
in interrogation rooms, witnesses in the courtroom likely have a solid
understanding of what questions will be asked and what evidence will be
relevant to those questions. While the interrogators in the Hartwig study
could easily withhold some evidence, get a story from the suspect, and then
present the evidence to the suspect to probe for inconsistencies, attorneys
attacking credibility on cross-examination will rarely have this opportunity.
In civil cases, where discovery provides all parties with the relevant
evidence, a lying witness has plenty of time and information to craft a
consistent story. Even in criminal cases, suspects may know, from their
128

Maria Hartwig et al., Detecting Deception via Strategic Disclosure of Evidence, 29 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 469, 473–74 (2005).
129
Id. at 473.
130
Id. at 475. The three pieces of evidence claimed against the student were that one witness had
seen the student outside the video store, that one witness had seen the student inside the video store, and
that the student’s fingerprints were contained on the briefcase from which the wallet was stolen. Id.
131
Id.
132
Id. at 476.
133
Id. at 477.
134
See Minzner, supra note 115, at 2571 (“What do these results about demeanor, bias, and context
indicate about lie detection in the legal system? . . . When a legal decision-maker possesses private
information and uses it to probe the witness’s story, lie detection accuracy will improve. . . . If the police
and juries have multiple independent sources of information about an event, they are far more likely to
accurately decide which witnesses to believe.”).

1471

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

interactions with the police, enough of the evidence against them such that
they can form a coherent story.135 Perhaps jurors could watch a video of the
interrogation and assess credibility based on that video. But this would
require a shift in police policy, since evidence is quickly disclosed to the
suspect in the majority of interrogations.136 This method would also only be
effective in criminal cases where there is an interrogation to be shown to the
jurors, and overconfidence of interrogators may influence the interrogation
and bias the jury. Additionally, while the late disclosure method increased
accuracy among passive viewers in credibility assessment, it still only
resulted in 62% accuracy. Is this level of accuracy sufficient to declare that
the jury is so good at detecting lies that it should be the sole credibility
assessor?
It is also notable that the observers in the late disclosure condition were
not equally adept at classifying both truth telling and lying: 68% of the
deceptive interrogations were correctly classified compared to only 54% of
the truthful interrogations.137 This has implications for the normative
distribution of outcomes in the trial system. For example, employing the
late disclosure method would presumably reduce the perceived credibility
of a defendant who chooses to testify, since the data suggest that more liars
would be correctly classified than truth tellers. This could increase the
number of verdicts rendered against criminal defendants—a high price to
pay for a small increase in the accuracy of credibility judgments.
In a follow-up to their 2005 study, Hartwig and colleagues trained
police officers in employing the late disclosure interrogation method.138
Mock crimes and interrogations were conducted as in the 2005 Hartwig
study,139 but in this experiment, the interrogators themselves judged the
veracity of the suspects’ statements.140 The interviewers trained to use the
late disclosure strategy reached an accuracy level of 85%, while the
135

Such knowledge could arise from several different sources. Police may reveal evidence to the
suspect during interrogation. See Hartwig, supra note 128, at 470. Additionally, certain types of
evidence must be revealed to the defendant prior to trial, such as documents that the prosecution plans to
use in its case-in-chief or the testimony of expert witnesses, which will typically include forensic
experts. See FED. R. CRIM. PROC. 16(a)(1)(E)–(F).
136
Hartwig, supra note 128, at 470 (“In an American study, this disclosure of evidence, often
together with a suggestion of guilt, was the typical way to start the interrogation, and occurred in more
than 80% of the cases.” (citing Richard A. Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 266 (1996))).
137
Id. at 478.
138
Maria Hartwig et al., Strategic Use of Evidence During Police Interviews: When Training to
Detect Deception Works, 30 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 603, 608 (2006) (“[The officers] were trained in
planning and asking questions concerning the evidence without disclosing it to the suspect. For example,
if the case-file included information that a suspect’s car had been seen close to a crime scene on the day
of the crime, they were taught to plan and ask questions about the suspect’s car . . . . They then practiced
the strategic use of [this] technique on each other several times . . . .”).
139
Id. at 608–10.
140
Id. at 610.
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interviewers using the early disclosure strategy were accurate only 56% of
the time.141
While these results are more striking than those of the 2005 Hartwig
study, they are also much less applicable to jurors. At trial, the jury is
simply the passive observer of evidence, not the interrogator. Juries cannot
employ the late disclosure method themselves as in the 2006 Hartwig
experiment. While the interrogators using the late disclosure strategy were
very accurate in their own credibility assessments, it is not clear whether
passive observers would be as accurate, and in fact they were not as
accurate in the 2005 Hartwig study. Additionally, the 2006 Hartwig study
used a three-hour training protocol,142 which might be more training than the
judicial system is willing to devote to teach jurors about credibility
assessment, especially when that training may not even be effective.
D. Should the Jury Be the Lie Detector?
It is clear that there is a gap in the literature with regard to the jury’s
ability to assess credibility. While studies confining the assessment of
credibility to demeanor-based evidence have shown that individuals have
poor accuracy, studies in which individuals are able to use context reflect
improved accuracy. However, none of these studies are directly applicable
to the courtroom setting. There has not been a systematic study in which
individuals hear inconsistent testimony from multiple senders and then
assess the credibility of each sender, as jurors would in the courtroom.
When more sophisticated research like this is conducted, researchers will
have a better grasp of the extent to which jurors can assess the credibility of
witnesses without the help of experts.
For now, however, the legal community is left with an incomplete
understanding. Even the most optimistic studies that are remotely
applicable to the courtroom suggest that individuals are just over 60%
accurate in credibility assessments.143 Yet courts continue to hold onto the
shaky assumption that the jury is capable of being the sole assessor of
credibility. This unsophisticated notion should be put to rest, as Justice
Kennedy suggested in United States v. Scheffer,144 and the only factor
concerning the admissibility of expert testimony related to credibility
should be its reliability under Daubert or Frye.

141

Id. at 613.
Id. at 608.
143
See Hartwig et al., supra note 128, at 477.
144
523 U.S. 303, 318–19 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(“[I]t seems the principal opinion overreaches when it rests its holding on the additional ground that the
jury’s role in making credibility determinations is diminished when it hears polygraph evidence. . . . [It]
demeans and mistakes the role and competence of jurors . . . .”).
142
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However, the court does not lightly change its doctrine in response to
social science evidence,145 so courts will likely continue to be skeptical of
neuroscience-based credibility-assessment evidence based on the notion
that it “impinges on the province of the jury.”146 What does this mean for
the admissibility of both the CQT and the CIT? If the jury is considered the
sole assessor of credibility, it almost surely strikes the death knell for the
CQT, which purports to directly identify truths and lies. As seen in Wilson
v. Corestaff Services L.P., courts following the standard laid out in Scheffer
will likely continue to reject a CQT test, whether it is conducted using
polygraph or fMRI, without even having to consider its reliability.
The CIT, however, may not violate the Scheffer standard because it is
much more like substantive evidence than it is like credibility assessment.
While the results of a CIT may undermine the credibility of a witness
indirectly, the CIT (unlike the CQT) makes no direct claims as to whether a
witness is lying or telling the truth. Instead, the CIT provides substantive
evidence and leaves the credibility assessment itself to the jury. For
example, if an individual defending a murder charge maintains he was not
at the crime scene, but the results of a CIT indicate that he recognized the
murder weapon, the CIT itself does not indicate that he is lying. Instead, it
provides substantive evidence that is probative for the trier of fact’s
ultimate conclusion about the veracity of his testimony. Similarly, a blood
sample found at the scene of the crime that contains the defendant’s DNA
strongly undermines the defendant’s claim of innocence, but we would not
consider it credibility-assessment evidence. If substantive evidence like this
were to be considered credibility-assessment evidence, every piece of
relevant evidence, by definition, would go to the veracity of the defendant’s
plea of “not guilty” or “not liable” and would therefore be inadmissible.
Despite the fact that logical analysis would group the CIT with other
substantive evidence, the CIT is in danger of being grouped with the CQT
as a pure credibility-assessment device for several reasons. First, because
the CIT was first conducted using the polygraph,147 it is likely to continue to
be associated with the CQT, which is a credibility-assessment test at its
very core. Courts have not overtly made the distinction between the CIT
and the CQT, frequently just referring to both as “polygraph” evidence,148
but not referencing each test’s merits and flaws.149

145

See, e.g., McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 287, 291 n.7 (1987) (accepting a social science
study as demonstrating that “black defendants . . . who kill white victims have the greatest likelihood of
receiving the death penalty” but reading the results narrowly and as insufficient to support a
constitutional challenge).
146
Wilson v. Corestaff Servs. L.P., 900 N.Y.S.2d 639, 642 (Sup. Ct. 2010).
147
See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
148
See Erikson, supra note 61, at 785–86.
149
See, e.g., Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 309 (“[T]here is simply no consensus that polygraph evidence is
reliable.” (emphasis added)).
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Second, even though the CIT does not detect any actual lying, because
the CIT only provides evidence of a mental state, courts could still draw a
distinction between the CIT and other forms of substantive forensic
evidence, such as fingerprints or DNA samples. The court may consider any
test of brain activity to be one of credibility assessment in nature, regardless
of whether the test is identifying lies or simply the presence of concealed
information. Third, because the history of the CIT is so intertwined with
that of the CQT, the association between the tests will be difficult to
countermand. The CIT was born out of frustrations with the theoretical and
practical shortfalls of the CQT.150 The CIT literature is rife with debate over
which method is more accurate and reliable, and the community could be
described as being split into two rival factions: CIT proponents and CQT
proponents.151 Many CIT articles are prefaced by the shortcomings of the
CQT, espousing the CIT as a valid alternative.152 This type of language
implies that the two tests are performing the same credibility-assessing job,
despite the fact that they actually have very different functions. And many
published CIT articles are titled in ways that imply the CIT is a deceptiondetection tool, rather than a recognition-detection tool.153
To summarize, we have seen that under Scheffer, scientific expert
testimony whose relevance is the credibility of one of the witnesses at trial
will be excluded on the basis that the jury itself should assess the credibility
of the witnesses. However, we have also seen that laypeople are usually at
or below chance accuracy in assessing whether individuals are lying based
purely on demeanor. Training is unlikely to help jurors become better
credibility assessors and may actually make them worse by causing them to
be overconfident in their credibility assessments to the detriment of
assessments they may be more effective at making, such as the
determination of the quality of the evidence presented. Jurors likely assess
credibility based on the content of the message in addition to demeanor, but
there is no strong evidence suggesting that jurors are effective at detecting
150

See Iacono, supra note 24, at 689 (“The [CIT] . . . has been developed and promoted by Lykken
as a scientifically based alternative to the CQT.”); Lykken, supra note 45, at 385 (“Use of physiological
measurements to detect not lying, but the presence of ‘guilty knowledge,’ requires . . . [a] more
reasonable assumption [than those required by the CQT].”). Notably, the very first paragraph of the very
first CIT study ever published focused on the shortcomings of more traditional “lie detector” tests.
Lykken, supra note 45, at 385.
151
Compare Iacono & Lykken, supra note 20, § 40:45–119 (writing a chapter titled “The Case
Against Polygraph Tests,” describing shortcomings of the CQT and related tests and instead favoring the
CIT), with Honts et al., supra note 33, § 40:20–44 (writing a countering chapter entitled “The Case for
Polygraph Tests,” arguing in favor of the CQT and related tests’ validity).
152
See, e.g., Ralf Mertens & John J.B. Allen, The Role of Psychophysiology in Forensic
Assessments: Deception Detection, ERPs, and Virtual Reality Mock Crime Scenarios,
45 PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY 286, 286 (2008) (“Conventional field polygraph examinations, based on the
control-question technique (CQT), suffer from many limitations and have been widely criticized in the
scientific literature.”).
153
See, e.g., Farwell & Donchin, supra note 48; Mertens & Allen, supra note 152.
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lies through the content of the testimony, as the research done in this area is
not a good analogue for the experience of the juror at trial. Thus, if accuracy
is an important motivator, the current social science data counsel against
allowing the jury to function as the sole assessor of credibility.
III. THE DAUBERT CRITERIA AS A HURDLE TO ADMISSIBILITY
If the court does not revise the “jury [as] the lie detector” doctrine
explained in Scheffer,154 the court will not reach the second stage of
analysis: whether the CQT and CIT are reliable enough to meet the standard
laid out in Federal Rule of Evidence 702. However, as discussed in Part II,
social science research may eventually push the court to consider allowing
experts to assist the trier of fact in the credibility-assessment role. Even if
courts do not revise their stance on experts offering credibility-assessment
evidence but are willing to accept the CIT as substantive evidence rather
than credibility-assessment evidence, the court will need to assess its
reliability in determining admissibility. This Part examines the potential
admissibility of the CIT and, to a lesser extent, the CQT, under the Federal
Rules of Evidence.
A. Frye v. United States, Federal Rule of Evidence 702, and the
Daubert Standard
For nearly seventy years, admissibility of scientific expert testimony
was determined under the standard laid out in Frye v. United States, a case
that itself actually decided admissibility of a type of credibility-assessment
evidence.155 In that case, the D.C. Circuit outlined a “general acceptance”
test under which any scientific evidence that is to be admissible “must be
sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular
field in which it belongs.”156 While this was not a Supreme Court decision,
federal courts generally followed this until the Supreme Court’s decision in
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.157
In Daubert, the Supreme Court noted that the Frye standard had been
the subject of frequent debate.158 Interpreting Federal Rule of Evidence 702,
the Court stated that the Rule does not indicate that “general acceptance” is

154

Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 313 (quoting United States v. Barnard, 490 F.2d 907, 912 (9th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 959 (1974)).
155
293 F. 1013, 1013–14 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (ruling that the “systolic blood pressure deception test,” a
precursor to the polygraph-based CQT, had not gained “general acceptance” among physiological and
psychological authorities and therefore should not be admitted as evidence).
156
Id. at 1014.
157
509 U.S. 579 (1993).
158
Id. at 586.
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a requirement of reliability.159 In fact, the advisory committee notes to the
originally enacted version of Rule 702 never mention “general acceptance,”
and instead state that “[w]hether the situation is a proper one for the use of
expert testimony is to be determined on the basis of assisting the trier.”160
The advisory committee notes to the proposed 1991 amendment of Rule
702 explicitly state that “[t]he rule does not mandate a return to the
strictures of Frye v. United States.”161 The Daubert Court noted that a strict
requirement of “general acceptance” limits the “liberal thrust” of the
Federal Rules, which, under Rule 401, envision the acceptance of evidence
that is relevant at virtually any level.162 Thus, Daubert explicitly stated that
the Frye test should not be used in federal courts.163
In replacing Frye, the Daubert Court provided four nonexclusive
factors for the judge to consider when determining whether scientific
evidence is sufficiently reliable:164
•
•
•
•

“[W]hether [the theory or technique] can be (and has been)
tested,”165
“[W]hether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer
review and publication,”166
“[T]he known or potential rate of error,”167 and
The “general acceptance” of the technique.168

159

Id. at 588 (“Nothing in the text of this Rule establishes ‘general acceptance’ as an absolute
prerequisite to its admissibility . . . [nor] present[s] any clear indication that Rule 702 or the Rules as a
whole were intended to incorporate a ‘general acceptance’ standard.”).
160
FED. R. EVID. 702 committee note (1975).
161
Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the
Federal Rules of Evidence, 137 F.R.D. 53, 157 (1991) (describing the proposed amendment to FED. R.
EVID. 702 and the accompanying committee notes).
162
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587–88. Rule 401 is a highly lenient rule of relevancy, requiring only that
evidence have “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” FED.
R. EVID. 401. This rule has been repeatedly determined to be a liberal standard. See JACK B. WEINSTEIN
& MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S EVIDENCE MANUAL § 6.01[5][a] (8th ed. 2007).
163
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589 (“That austere standard, absent from, and incompatible with, the
Federal Rules of Evidence, should not be applied in federal trials.”).
164
Id. at 593–94.
165
Id. at 593.
166
Id. This criterion was specifically mentioned by the Court as being “relevant, though not
dispositive” because “some propositions . . . are . . . too new, or of too limited interest to be published.”
Id. at 593–94.
167
Id. at 594. The court did not give any guidelines as to what would constitute an acceptable rate
of error.
168
Id. This factor is the very same test from Frye that the Court declared was no longer controlling.
The Court explained the factor by stating that the Frye test was unnecessarily strict because a “reliability
assessment does not require . . . an express determination of a particular degree of acceptance within the
community.” Id. (quoting United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1238 (3d Cir. 1985)). But this
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In 2000, Rule 702 was amended to codify the Daubert factors.169 The
revised rule provides that an expert may testify as to an opinion only “if
(1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is
the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has
applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.”170
Typically, when proffered scientific testimony is contested by the
opposing party, the trial court will hold an evidentiary hearing, called a
Daubert hearing, to determine the reliability of the testimony.171 The
remainder of this Part examines the likely outcome of such a hearing as
applied to the P300-based CIT,172 and to a lesser extent, the fMRI-based
CQT.
B. The Daubert Standard Applied to the fMRI-Based CQT
In the wake of the sudden increase in fMRI-based lie-detection
research over the past decade,173 a number of scholars anticipated the
question that would eventually face the court in United States v. Semrau: Is
the fMRI-based CQT admissible under the Daubert standard?174 Because
factor can have a bearing in the eventual calculus because a known technique that has not been accepted
in its field should be viewed with skepticism. See id.
169
WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 162, § 13.02[4][a]. The rule also codifies the Supreme
Court’s holding in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999), that Daubert’s principles apply
to all expert testimony admissible under Rule 702. FED. R. EVID. 702 committee note (2000). While the
Daubert standard has been codified into the Federal Rules of Evidence and is therefore used in all
federal courts, some state courts that have not adopted the rules still use the Frye test in determinations
of the admissibility of scientific evidence. See, e.g., Grady v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 839 A.2d 1038, 1045 (Pa.
2003) (requiring general acceptance of an expert’s methods).
170
FED. R. EVID. 702.
171
WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 162, § 13.02[4][c][ii].
172
As of the writing of this Comment, no federal court has held a formal Daubert hearing regarding
the admissibility of the CIT.
173
Prior to 2000, there had been no published research using fMRI to detect deception. However,
from 2000 to 2008, there were fifteen papers published on the subject. See Kamila E. Sip et al.,
Detecting Deception: The Scope and Limits, 12 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 48, 51 tbl.1 (2008).
174
Many articles focusing on the admissibility of fMRI-based lie detection are pessimistic as to
potential admissibility, but some offer countering views. Compare Archie Alexander, Functional
Magnetic Resonance Imaging Lie Detection: Is a “Brainstorm” Heading Toward the “Gatekeeper”?,
7 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1, 49–55 (2007) (arguing that fMRI-based lie detection is not generally
accepted within the field and that the “analytical gap” from experimental studies to practical application
is too great), Joëlle Anne Moreno, The Future of Neuroimaged Lie Detection and the Law, 42 AKRON L.
REV. 717, 734–36 (2009) (describing the potential uses and limits of cognitive neuroscience in the
courtroom), Moriarty, supra note 31, at 758–61 (2009) (arguing that the number of fMRI lie-detection
studies is too small to be considered reliable, that there has been too little replication of past research,
and that these studies are not close enough to real-life situations to be applicable), and Cooper
Ellenberg, Note, Lie Detection: A Changing of the Guard in the Quest for Truth in Court?, 33 LAW &
PSYCHOL. REV. 139, 147 (2009) (stating that fMRI-based lie detection does not currently have the
necessary accuracy rates to reach admissibility but that there is potential for future admissibility), with
Leo Kittay, Note, Admissibility of fMRI Lie Detection: The Cultural Bias Against “Mind Reading”
Devices, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 1351, 1376–79 (2007) (stating that the general widespread acceptance of
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this question has been well discussed in the legal literature, this Comment
will not examine each of the Daubert factors as applied to the commercially
available fMRI-based CQT like the one that was offered in Semrau, but
instead will examine general acceptance and rate of error, since these
factors pose the greatest barriers to admissibility.175
Perhaps the most serious problem for proponents of fMRI-based CQT
evidence is the lack of general acceptance in the field. This factor warrants
extra consideration in the analysis because it not only influences federal
courts and other jurisdictions that have adopted the Daubert standard, but
also those states that continue to use the Frye test. It would be very difficult
to argue that fMRI-based lie detection is “generally accepted” in the field of
neuroscience. At least one neurologist has called for statutory regulation of
the method, stating that the high level of discretion by the trial judge under
the Daubert standard could lead to unwarranted admission of an fMRIbased CQT.176 Other notable scholars in the field have taken a less extreme
position, but have firmly stated that the fMRI-based CQT is not ready for
courts.177
Some scholars have argued that the mere fact that fMRI itself is
generally accepted in the field of neuroscience, a proposition that is
unquestionably true,178 means that fMRI-based lie detection should also be
considered generally accepted.179 This view misconstrues the meaning of the
general acceptance test, which analyzes the general acceptance of the
specific method being applied, not the underlying framework.180 For
example, general acceptance in the field of biology that humans are made
up of DNA that is unique on an individual level would not allow for the
admissibility of forensic DNA evidence until the process of matching an
fMRI research meets the general acceptance test and that the error rate for fMRI-based lie detection is
lower than that of other forensic evidence that is regularly admitted).
175
I should also note that some of the studies described here do not follow the traditional CQT
format, but are instead hybrids between the CQT and other types of lie-detection protocols. While a
more nuanced approach would be necessary for a complete assessment of the admissibility of these tests,
the critical distinction here is that these fMRI-based tests all seek to determine whether a person is being
truthful, as the CQT does, instead of determining whether a person recognizes information related to a
crime, as the CIT does. Thus, I loosely use the term CQT to refer to these fMRI-based CQT-like tests.
176
Henry T. Greely & Judy Illes, Neuroscience-Based Lie Detection: The Urgent Need for
Regulation, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 377, 413 (2007) (“The federal government—or, barring that, state
governments—should ban any non-research use of new methods of lie detection, including specifically
fMRI-based lie detection, unless or until the method has been proven safe and effective to the
satisfaction of a regulatory agency and has been vetted through the peer-reviewed scientific literature.”).
177
See sources cited supra note 174.
178
A Google Scholar search for “fMRI” yields thousands of citations in scholarly journals, and
fMRI is regularly used in neuroscience research.
179
See, e.g., Kittay, supra note 174, at 1383.
180
For example, Frye held that a systolic blood pressure test to measure deception was not
generally accepted despite the fact that the measurement of blood pressure was undoubtedly widely
accepted in medicine at the time. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
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individual with a DNA sample from a crime scene has been generally
accepted in the field. While scholars agree that fMRI is a valid method,
there is not broad agreement that its use for lie detection is valid.
The fMRI-based CQT may also have difficulty meeting the accuracy
requirement of Daubert. Across the small number of published fMRI-based
CQT studies, accuracy rates have varied between 78% and 90%.181 While it
is unclear exactly what error rates are necessary to survive the Daubert
analysis,182 Leo Kittay has argued that because some types of forensic
evidence that are commonly admitted, such as fingerprint analysis, have
lower accuracy rates, fMRI-based lie detection should pass the error rate
test.183 This argument, however, assumes that these types of forensic
evidence are being admitted due to their reliability rather than their strong
tradition of admissibility, which may not be true.184 Just as tradition may
keep unreliable forensic sciences in the court, the past history of the
inadmissibility of the CQT conducted using the polygraph may make it
difficult for the fMRI-based CQT to be admitted. Even if the Daubert
criteria are met, because courts have rejected lie-detection evidence for
years, they are likely to remain skeptical of sudden increases in published
accuracy rates because of a change in the machine used to conduct the
test.185 Of course, such reasoning is not grounded in the reliability-seeking
considerations of Daubert, but it is a factor that will likely influence
admissibility decisions.
While many of the fMRI-based CQT reliability issues are theoretically
correctable through further experimentation and refinement, it seems likely
that the field will take time to address these problems. Combined with the

181

See Kozel et al., supra note 35, at 610 (describing a 90% accuracy rate); Langleben et al., supra
note 35, at 269 (reporting a 78% accuracy rate). Additionally, these studies have only occurred in lab
settings and have never tested real-world deception.
182
The Daubert opinion only mentions that courts “should consider the known or potential rate of
error.” Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993). The case is silent, however, as
to what rate of error is sufficient to meet the test.
183
See Kittay, supra note 174, at 1382. A number of types of commonly admitted forensic evidence
have recently come under scrutiny for being inaccurate. A 2009 report from the National Research
Council called for a major overhaul of the forensic sciences, stating that: “In a number of forensic
science disciplines, forensic science professionals have yet to establish either the validity of their
approach or the accuracy of their conclusions . . . .” NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING
FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 53 (2009).
184
Cf. United States v. Llera Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549, 571–72 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (recognizing the
potential for inaccurate fingerprint evidence, but still allowing its use by an expert at trial).
185
One related problem may be that the probative accuracy may not be enough to overcome the
prejudicial influence of the test. Rule 403 provides that “[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded
if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” FED. R. EVID. 403.
Particularly in unilaterally obtained lie-detection tests, where the test is sought by one of the parties and
will not be used if the outcome is not to that party’s liking, the probative value is small because the party
has nothing to lose by taking the test.
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courts’ long-standing policy against admitting true lie-detection evidence, it
is unlikely that the fMRI-based CQT will be admitted in the near future.
C. The Daubert Standard Applied to the CIT
Unlike the fMRI-based CQT, the P300-based CIT has over twenty
years of published research supporting it.186 Despite this history, the test has
rarely been proffered as evidence in court and has been largely ignored in
both case law and the legal literature.187 There are currently no published
cases that have conducted a formal Daubert hearing regarding the
admissibility of either a P300-based or polygraph-based CIT. However, a
form of the P300-based CIT has been proffered in two state court postconviction murder exoneration cases: Harrington v. State, an Iowa case in
which the P300-based CIT was partially admitted into evidence,188 and
Slaughter v. State, an Oklahoma case in which the P300-based CIT was
rejected.189 Both cases considered the admissibility of a P300-based CIT
conducted by Brain Fingerprinting Laboratories, started by Dr. Lawrence
Farwell, which is the only company that currently offers a commercially
available CIT.190 Despite these cases and the increasing prevalence of
neuroimaging evidence in court, no article has thoroughly examined the
P300-based CIT’s admissibility under Daubert.191 The remainder of this
Part discusses how the P300-based CIT would fare under each of these
factors and concludes that while the P300-based CIT should not currently
186

See, e.g., Rosenfeld et al., supra note 48.
A Westlaw search of the “All State and Federal Cases” database conducted on July 6, 2012, for
“concealed information test” yielded only one result. A search in the same database for “guilty
knowledge test” (a synonymous term for the CIT) yielded seven additional responses. A search for
“polygraph” on the same database returned over 10,000 cases.
188
No. PCCV 073247, at *5–10 (Iowa Dist. Ct. Mar. 5, 2001).
189
105 P.3d 832, 835–36 (Okla. Crim. App. 2005). The Slaughter court noted that “Dr. Farwell
makes certain claims about the Brain Fingerprinting test that are not supported by anything other than
his bare affidavit.” Id. at 834–35. The court also opined that there was no evidence that Brain
Fingerprinting had been tested, subjected to peer-review, or otherwise met the Daubert factors and thus
would fail such an analysis. Id. at 836.
190
BRAIN FINGERPRINTING, http://www.governmentworks.com/bws/ (last visited Aug. 15, 2012). A
brain fingerprinting test is similar to other P300-based CITs. A subject is shown probe items that relate
to a particular crime or event and irrelevant items of the same class that do not relate to the crime or
event. A larger P300 is expected to occur to probe items if the subject has knowledge of the crime or
event in question. See Lawrence A. Farwell & Sharon S. Smith, Using Brain MERMER Testing to
Detect Knowledge Despite Efforts to Conceal, 46 J. FORENSIC SCI. 135, 136 (2001). However, in
addition to the P300, brain fingerprinting uses a secondary brain response, termed by Farwell as the
MERMER effect. See id. at 135. The basis for the MERMER effect is never explained by Farwell as it is
the proprietary secret of the Brain Fingerprinting company. See J. Peter Rosenfeld, ‘Brain
Fingerprinting’: A Critical Analysis, 4 SCI. REV. MENTAL HEALTH PRAC. 20, 23 (2005).
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Some articles have discussed the admissibility of the P300-based CIT under Daubert, but have
not discussed each factor in detail. See, e.g., Erikson, supra note 61; Eric K. Gerard, Waiting in the
Wings? The Admissibility of Neuroimagery for Lie Detection, 27 DEV. MENTAL HEALTH L., July 2008,
at 1.
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be admissible under Daubert, it should be admissible in the future once
more critical studies are conducted to address its accuracy in real-world
situations.
1. Testability.—Testability as described by the Daubert Court is
likely the easiest factor for the P300-based CIT to meet. Testability, or
falsifiability, of a scientific theory is typically considered the chief criterion
of scientific status.192 If a particular test or theory is not falsifiable, it will
generally not be considered a science and thus will struggle to meet the
other Daubert criteria.193 In this manner, the testability factor could be
considered a threshold standard, though it was not labeled as such by the
Daubert Court.
Courts would very likely consider the P300-based CIT testable. Like
any other diagnostic test, the P300-based CIT’s accuracy can be determined
by conducting the test on an individual for whom ground truth is known.194
For example, many tests of the P300-based CIT compare CIT results from
participants who commit a mock crime with results from participants who
have not committed any crime but are given the same CIT, thereby directly
testing diagnostic accuracy.195
One criticism of the CIT’s testability is that it is very difficult to assess
the CIT’s accuracy in real-world conditions because it would be nearly
impossible to know whether the suspect had actually committed the crime.
While this complaint is a valid one for the rate of error factor in the sense
that experiments of this type have not been conducted and so the error rate
of the P300-based CIT in the field is not known, it is not true that these
types of tests could not be conducted. If the CIT were given to a number of
criminal suspects and incontrovertible independent evidence (such as DNA
testing) were later revealed that determined the suspect’s guilt or innocence,
the effectiveness of the CIT in the field could be assessed. Thus, the CIT is
testable, and though one could argue that it has not yet been fully tested in
the most realistic scenarios, its basic reliability has been repeatedly tested.196
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Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993) (“[T]he criterion of the scientific
status of a theory is its falsifiability, or refutability, or testability.” (quoting KARL R. POPPER,
CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS: THE GROWTH OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 37 (5th ed. 1989)
(emphasis omitted))). A science is generally understood to be falsifiable when it is “capable of empirical
test” such that the theories on which the method is based could be objectively proven wrong. See id.
(quoting CARL GUSTAV HEMPEL, PHILOSOPHY OF NATURAL SCIENCE 49 (1966)).
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See David L. Faigman et al., Admissibility of Scientific Evidence, 1 MODERN SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE, supra note 20, § 1:16.
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Ground truth is known in a CIT where the researchers know, a priori, whether a participant
possesses the concealed information they are attempting to detect. Thus, the researchers can determine
whether their test came to the correct result, unlike in cases where ground truth is not known.
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See, e.g., Meixner & Rosenfeld, supra note 44, at 2.
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See, e.g., Farwell & Donchin, supra note 48; Meixner & Rosenfeld, supra note 44; Rosenfeld et
al., supra note 48.
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2.

Peer Review, Publication, and General Acceptance in the
Field.—The P300-based CIT is also likely to pass Daubert’s “peer
review” factor. The Daubert Court specifically noted that this factor “does
not necessarily correlate with reliability” but instead reflects “the likelihood
that substantive flaws in methodology will be detected.”197 The CIT has
undergone substantial peer review.198 As a group of researchers repeatedly
publish papers using similar methods, these methods become exposed to
multiple phases of peer review designed to eliminate methodological errors.
For example, the Rosenfeld lab at Northwestern University has produced
results of a highly accurate P300-based CIT protocol across three separate
publications.199 With the repetition of similar studies, it is likely that the
peer review process will weed out major methodological flaws.
When a court is considering whether a particular method has been
subjected to peer review, it must examine the specific method being
presented. In Harrington, the court noted that while the P300 component
itself had been “extensively tested and reviewed,” Brain Fingerprinting,
which uses a specific proprietary “MERMER” algorithm, had not been
tested.200 Thus, a CIT relying only on the well-published P300 brain wave
will be considered to be peer reviewed, while modified versions that have
not been published, like Brain Fingerprinting, will not pass muster.
Many of the same considerations apply to the question of whether the
P300-based CIT is “generally accepted” in the field. It is not sufficient that
the P300 brain wave itself is well-established in the field; its use as an
indicator of concealed information must be generally accepted as well. The
Harrington court accepted that the P300 is a reliable marker of the
recognition of salient information, but was unclear as to whether it accepted
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Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593.
A search on Google Scholar for “P300-based concealed information test” and “P300-based
guilty knowledge test” conducted on July 6, 2012, revealed more than fifty peer-reviewed publications
of empirical tests of the CIT on only the first five pages of results, and many more papers have
undoubtedly been published. These publications have come from a number of labs both within the
United States and abroad, indicating peer-reviewed replication of the validity of the CIT.
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See Meixner & Rosenfeld, supra note 44; Rosenfeld et al., supra note 49; Michael R. Winograd
& J. Peter Rosenfeld, Mock Crime Application of the Complex Trial Protocol (CTP) P300-Based
Concealed Information Test, 48 PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY 155 (2010). It should be noted that the research
coming from this lab is, in part, my own. However, other labs have also tested the P300-based CIT. See,
e.g., John J. Allen et al., The Identification of Concealed Memories Using the Event-Related Potential
and Implicit Behavioral Measures: A Methodology for Prediction in the Face of Individual Differences,
29 PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY 504 (1992); Farwell & Donchin, supra note 48; Kenta Kubo & Hiroshi Nittono,
The Role of Intention to Conceal in the P300-Based Concealed Information Test, 34 APPLIED
PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY & BIOFEEDBACK 227 (2009).
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See Harrington v. State, No. PCCV 073247, at *8–9 (Iowa Dist. Ct. Mar. 5, 2001). A full
explanation of the basis of the MERMER algorithm and the difference between Brain Fingerprinting and
the more mainstream P300-based CIT is beyond the scope of this Comment. For an excellent discussion
of this topic, see Rosenfeld, supra note 190.
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the applied use of the P300 in a CIT.201 However, the court clearly rejected
the Brain Fingerprinting MERMER effect for lack of general acceptance in
the field,202 a view that has been supported by a recent publication
discussing the many problems with Brain Fingerprinting.203
Unlike the specific Brain Fingerprinting MERMER method, individual
surveys have shown that the CIT itself is generally accepted.204 William
Iacono & David Lykken surveyed members of the Society for
Psychophysiological Research, asking them whether the CQT and CIT were
“based on scientifically sound psychological principles or theory.”205 Only
36% of the respondents stated that the CQT was based on scientifically
sound principles, but 77% agreed that the CIT was scientifically sound.206
Among members of the American Psychological Association, the results
were very similar, with 30% and 72% agreeing that the CQT and CIT were
scientifically sound, respectively.207 This survey was conducted in 1997, and
with the increasing existence of publications regarding the CIT, it is likely
that this acceptance rate has increased. While these numbers do not indicate
complete confidence among the scientific community in the CIT, it is
unlikely that the general acceptance factor would keep the CIT out of the
courtroom.
3. Rate of Error.—The Daubert Court did not specify what error rate
is tolerable for admissibility. This has left courts confused in interpreting
error rates of various types of scientific testimony.208 However, while this
may seem like simple oversight or reluctance to form an easily applied
bright-line rule on the part of the Daubert Court, the failure to specify a
maximum error rate is defensible on the grounds that differing error rates
are acceptable in different contexts. Where the cost of making a mistake is
higher, a lower maximum error rate should be required.209 For example, “a
judge might require a relatively low error rate before admitting predictions
of violence in a capital case, but permit higher error rates in a probation
matter.”210 This distinction does not run merely across the potential level of
punishment either. Thus, a Federal Rule of Evidence 403 prejudice
determination is naturally intertwined with determining the acceptable level
of error—in cases where the expert’s testimony is highly likely to prejudice
201

Harrington, No. PCCV 073247, at *9.
Id.
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See Rosenfeld, supra note 190.
204
See, e.g., W.G. Iacono & D.T. Lykken, The Validity of the Lie Detector: Two Surveys of
Scientific Opinion, 82 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 426, 426–28 (1997).
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Id. at 430 tbl.2.
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the jury and become a critical piece of evidence in the case, the error rate
will likely be viewed more strictly.
Under this rationale, one can envision the error rate of the CIT being
judged very differently depending on the context of the case. Research on
the CIT has been predominantly in the criminal context,211 making the
evidence likely to be considered more prejudicial and thus requiring a
higher standard of accuracy. In a murder trial, for example, the result of the
CIT could be a critical piece of information that determines whether the
defendant is convicted, and thus likely to be highly prejudicial. In this case,
a trial judge would be wise to require a high accuracy rate. However, in
other applications of the CIT where the potential prejudice is lower, such as
showing that an employee had knowledge of his employer’s discriminatory
hiring practices, a higher rate of error may be acceptable.
While this determination will always be a case-by-case decision for the
trial judge, recent P300-based CITs show promise to meet even the high
standard of accuracy that might be required at a criminal trial. One recent
study achieved a 100% accuracy rate among twenty-four participants being
tested for knowledge of a mock terrorist attack.212 Another paper from the
same laboratory reported a 92% accuracy rate, with one false negative and
one false positive among twenty-four participants.213 Most other studies
have typically found an 80% to 90% overall accuracy rate.214
However, the overall accuracy rate of a method is not the only
consideration. The error rate is comprised of two types of errors: “false
positives,” which are cases in which a person does not have concealed
knowledge but is detected as having such knowledge, and “false negatives,”
which are cases in which a person has concealed knowledge but it is not
detected by the test. These two types of errors cannot be viewed as equal: in
the criminal trial, for example, where the burden of proof is designed to
ensure that innocent parties are not wrongfully convicted, a low falsepositive rate is extremely important in any type of forensic test.
One of the CIT’s strong points is that the false-positive error rate is
extremely low.215 In a CIT where the participant is shown one probe item
and four irrelevant items, an innocent participant would be expected to
show the largest P300 response to the probe item entirely by chance 20% of
the time. So, for example, if an individual accused of murder were shown
211

See, e.g., Meixner & Rosenfeld, supra note 44.
Id. at 150–51 & tbl.1.
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Rosenfeld et al., supra note 49, at 913 tbl.3b.
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See, e.g., Allen et al., supra note 199; Farwell & Donchin, supra note 48, at 539 tbl.2; Rosenfeld
et al., supra note 48, at 161; J. Peter Rosenfeld et al., Simple, Effective Countermeasures to P300-Based
Tests of Detection of Concealed Information, 41 PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY 205, 209 & tbl.1 (2004). One
recent test reported an accuracy rate as low as 50%. Mertens & Allen, supra note 152, at 293 tbl.3.
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See Iacono, supra note 24, at 689 (“A properly administered [CIT] with a sufficient number of
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different weapons, with a gun being the weapon used to commit the crime
and four other weapons as irrelevants, an innocent person would have the
largest response to the gun one-fifth of the time. However, as more classes
of questions are presented, this false-positive rate becomes exponentially
smaller. Thus, if the same individual were shown five weapons in one block
of testing and five addresses where the crime might have been committed in
a separate block, an innocent individual would only be expected to show the
largest P300 response to both probe items in one out of 25 cases, or about
4% of the time. If a third block is added, this number shrinks to one out of
125, and so on. A recent study that used this approach of testing multiple
blocks of items found a 0% false-positive rate,216 and most other P300-based
CITs have reported false-positive error rates below 10%.217
Even if high rates of false negative errors are found in a P300-based
CIT conducted on real crime suspects, there is still hope for admissibility. If
the false-positive error rate approaches zero, then even with a high falsenegative rate, the test still has probative value because in cases where the
test produces a positive result, jurors can be more certain that the defendant
has concealed knowledge.
Looming over all of these considerations, however, is one very large
problem for proponents of the P300-based CIT: there have not been any
studies of the P300-based CIT conducted on actual criminal suspects and
seeking information about their crimes. Thus, it remains unknown whether
the reported high accuracy rates from laboratory tests will translate to the
field. There is some reason for concern because one polygraph-based CIT
study conducted on actual suspects found high rates of false negative
errors.218 Such a test has not been done using the P300-based CIT. This
problem was specifically noted by the Semrau court with regard to the
fMRI-based CQT and is likely to be fatal to attempts to admit a P300-based
CIT until such studies are conducted.219 Interestingly, accuracy rates in the
field may actually exceed those in the laboratory because criminals who
planned crimes might be intimately familiar with the details of the crime,
leading to better recognition of those details and thereby larger P300
responses as compared to test participants who are only briefly exposed to
the crime-related details.220 However, this remains conjecture; it should not
be relied upon until it has been empirically tested.
216

Meixner & Rosenfeld, supra note 44, at 151 tbl.1. There is no reason that other CITs could not
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likely to recognize.
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Eitan Elaad, Detection of Guilty Knowledge in Real-Life Criminal Investigations, 75 J. APPLIED
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Thus, the CIT likely meets the testability, peer review, and general
acceptance prongs of Daubert. However, until field studies are conducted
using the P300-based CIT, courts are unlikely to find error rates generated
through laboratory tests to be sufficient to admit the CIT into evidence.
CONCLUSION
The law is at a crossroads regarding the admissibility of expert
testimony that assists the trier of fact in assessing credibility. As the
accuracy of fMRI and P300-based methods improve and become more
available to litigants both in the civil and criminal realms, courts must make
moral decisions regarding the admissibility of evidence in addition to
decisions based solely on accurate trial outcomes.
In addition to the factors discussed above that are relevant to
admissibility, courts will have to decide whether they truly want machines
to aid jurors in determining whether a witness is lying or whether a witness
had knowledge of information relating to a crime. Even a test that is
accurate enough to meet the Daubert standard will have serious
implications for perceived systemic legitimacy if it is persuasive enough to
yield a conviction without other strong supporting evidence but is not
accurate enough to ensure that an innocent person is never misdiagnosed.221
It is not clear whether this reduction in procedural justice would be worth
the gain in trial accuracy, though one could argue that modern forensic
science has the same problem yet continues to be admitted. Additionally,
there is a certain unease with using a mental state as evidence of a crime,
and an undesirable invasion of privacy could result from broad use of these
tools. These philosophical and policy questions, while beyond the scope of
this Comment, are worthy of further consideration, and must be approached
before we hand credibility assessment off to scientific experts.
However, the case against the trier of fact’s status as the most accurate
assessor of credibility continues to mount. The American common law has
consistently restricted decisions of credibility to the trier of fact, but recent
social science indicates that judges and jurors do not accurately use
demeanor cues offered by a witness to assess credibility. While studies that
put the testimony of a liar or truth teller in context show more promise for
the ability of laypeople to assess the veracity of witnesses, they still do not
approach the accuracy rates boasted by the modern P300-based CIT.
However, the jury is still out on the jury’s ability to detect lies in the
courtroom, as studies that provide mock jurors with the rich context of a
full trial have not been conducted.
For now, the science behind modern neuroscience-based credibilityassessment tools has not yet reached the standards that Daubert requires for
221
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admissibility at trial. The fMRI-based CQT remains inconsistent in
accuracy rates and has the same theoretical issues that have plagued the
polygraph-based CQT for years. The P300-based CIT, however, meets
many of the Daubert factors—it has been well tested throughout the
psychological literature and has consistently achieved high levels of
accuracy. Still, admissibility is not appropriate until realistic field tests of
the P300-based CIT are conducted.
However, the science behind these methods should progress quickly.
As it does, courts should not preclude these devices, which could help the
trier of fact make more accurate credibility decisions, leading to more
accurate trial outcomes. As it becomes more apparent that the jury alone
may not be the most accurate assessor of credibility, courts should consider
abandoning the tradition of the trier of fact as the sole assessor of
credibility. Though these methods are not yet ready for use in trials, the
court should not render its verdict against neuroscience-based credibility
assessment before it has heard all of the evidence.
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